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DIVINE COMMANDS AND THE SOCIAL
NATURE OF OBLIGATION
Robert Merrihew Adams

Di vine command metaethics is one of those theories according to which the nature of
ob ligation is grounded in personal or social relationships. In this paper I first try to show
how facts about human relationships can fill some of the role that facts of obligation are
supposed to play, specifically with regard to moral motivation and guilt. Then I note
certain problems that arise for social theories of obligation, and argue that they can be
dealt with more adequately by an expansion of our vision of the social dimension of
ethics to include God as the most important participant in our system of personal relationships.

Divine command metaethics is a type of social theory of the nature of obligation.
This statement makes two important points. (1) Divine command metaethics is
not about the nature of all ethical properties and facts but only about the nature
of those that we may call "the obligation family" of ethical properties and facts,
those expressed by such temlS as 'right', 'wrong', 'ought', and 'duty'. Other
sorts of ethical properties and facts are not less important to Christian ethics,
and theological theories may be offered about their nature too; but such theories
may be expected to involve other features of God rather than his commands.
For instance, we might theorize that the objectively disgusting is what disgusts
God. The present paper is exclusively about divine command theories, however;
and ethical properties not belonging to the obligation family will be mentioned
without any inquiry being made into their nature.
(2) Divine command metaethics is one of those theories according to which
the nature of obligation is social (in a broad sense of 'social' that encompasses
intimate personal relationships as well as "impersonal," institutional relationships
with larger groups). The central idea in divine command metaethics is the expansion of our vision of the social dimension of ethics to include God as the most
important participant in our system of personal relationships. In this paper I will
first try to show how facts about human relationships can fill some of the role
that facts of obligation are supposed to play, specifically with regard to moral
motivation (in section 1) and guilt (in section 2). Then (in section 3) I will note
certain problems that arise for social theories of obligation, and argue that they
can be dealt with more adequately by a divine command theory.
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This paper presupposes a view, for which I have argued elsewhere, about the
relation between conceptual analysis and theories of the nature of moral properties. On this view, what analysis of the concept of wrongness can tell us "is not
sufficient to determine what wrongness is. What it can tell us ... is that wrongness will be the property of actions (if there is one) that best fills" a certain role. 1
Moreover the identity of that property with wrongness will be necessary, though
not discoverable by conceptual analysis. I have little to add here to my defense
of this conception of the relation of metaethical theories to conceptual analysis.
What I hope to illuminate is rather the roles that wrongness, and other members
of the obligation family of ethical properties, are supposed to fill, and the reasons
for thinking (as I do) that those roles are best filled by properties involving a
relation to the commands of a loving God.
Section 1: How Social Requirements Motivate
It is essential to the point of any conception of obligation that obligations
motivate-that having an obligation to do x is generally regarded as a reason
for doing x. One problem about the nature of obligation is to understand this
motivation.
This will not be much of a problem if we assume that one is obliged only to
do things that one expects to have good results. Then the goodness of the results
provides a reason, and one's desires for such good consequences a motive, for
doing what one is obliged to do. Unfortunately, those who (like me) are not
utilitarians cannot assume that obligations will always be so happily attuned to
the value of expected results. We think we are sometimes obliged to tell the
truth and to keep promises, for example, when we do not expect the consequences
to be good. What would motivate us to do such a thing?
Even non-utilitarian moralists may not be satisfied with the reply that the
conscientious agent has good enough reason for her action simply in the fact
that it is right. This seems too abstract. John Rawls (certainly no utilitarian) writes,

The doctrine of the purely conscientious act is irrational. This doctrine
holds ... that the highest moral motive is the desire to do what is right
and just simply because it is right and just, no other description being
appropriate. . .. But on this interpretation the sense of right lacks any
apparent reason; it resembles a preference for tea rather than coffee. 2

If we are to see the fact of having an obligation as itself a reason for action, we
need a richer, less abstract understanding of the nature of obligation, in which
we might find something to motivate us.
According to social theories of the nature of obligation, having an obligation
to do something consists in being required (in a certain way, under certain

264

Faith and Philosophy

circumstances), by another person or a group of persons, to do it. This opens
more than one possibility for understanding obligations as reasons for action.
One reason or motive for complying with a social requirement, of course, is that
we fear punishment or retaliation for non-compliance. This is undoubtedly a real
factor, which helps to keep morality (and other benign, and not so benign, social
institutions) afloat. But here we are primarily interested in what other motives
there may be for compliance.
The alternative explanation that I wish to pursue in this section is that valuing
one's social bonds gives one, under certain conditions, a reason to do what is
required of one by one's associates or one's community (and thus to fulfill
obligations, understood as social requirements). This hypothesis is not to be
understood in a teleological sense. No doubt the desire to obtain or maintain a
certain kind of relationship does often contribute to the motivation for complying
with ~ocial requirements, but that is not all there is to social bonds as a motive.
The pattern of motivation to which I wish to call attention is one in which I
value the relationship which I see myself as actually having, and my complying
is an expression of my valuing and respecting the relationship. It is one in which
I act primarily out of a valuing of the relationship, rather than with the obtaining
or maintaining of the relationship as an end. 3
There are at least four aspects of the relational situation that matter motivationally with regard to compliance with social requirements. (1) It matters that the
demand is actually made. It is a question here of what other people do in fact
(reasonably or rightly) require of me, not just of what they could reasonably
require. The demand need not take the form of an explicit command or legislation;
it may be an expectation more subtly communicated; but the demand must
actually be made.
It lS much more fashionable in ethical theory to treat moral motivation as
depending on judgments about what an ideal community or authority would
demand under certain counterfactual conditions. However, I am very skeptical
of all these conditional accounts, for two reasons. First (the metaphysical reason),
I doubt that the relevant counterfactuals are true, partly because they seem to
be about free responses that are never actually made. 4 In the second place (the
more distinctively moral or motivational reason), I do not think I care very much
about whether these counterfactual conditionals are true. This is not to deny that
I care about some things that are closely connected with them; it is just to say
that the counterfactuals themselves are motivationally weak.
By contrast, actual demands made on us in relationships that we value are
undeniably real and motivationally strong. Most actual conscientiousness rests
at least partly on people's sense of such demands. Our awareness of this source
of moral motivation is reflected in appeals to "be a good citizen"--or, when in
a foreign country, to "remember that you are a guest."
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The actual making of the demand is important, not only to the strength, but
also to the character, of the motive. Not every good reason for doing something
makes it intelligible that I should feel that I have to do it. This is one of the
ways in which having even the best of reasons for doing something does not as
such amount to having an obligation to do it. But the perception that something
is demanded of me by other people, in a relationship that I value, does help to
make it intelligible that I should feel that I have to do it.
(2) It also matters motivationally how the individual who is subject to the
demand is related, and feels related, to those persons who are making the demand.
Let us assume, for purposes of this discussion, that the demand is made by a
community. The individual may be a member of the community, or a guest in
the community; but it is essential that there be some relation, and indeed some
favorably valued relation. The relation may arise through the individual's actioncommonly through a history of acts of loyalty and caring within the relationship;
occasionally through the action, beloved of social contract theorists, of voluntarily
joining the community or consenting explicitly to its institutions and principles.
But the community's attitude toward the individual is at least as important. Does
the community value the individual? Is its attitude toward her supportive and
respectful? It is well known that these questions have in fact a great influence
on moral motivation. An individual who feels neglected, despised, abused by
the community will be alienated, and will be much less inclined to comply
conscientiously with society's demands. I do not mean to say that the alienated
person should be exempt from blame for immoral or "anti-social" behavior, but
that often such behavior should be seen, not mainly as a falling away from
impersonal standards of right action, but as part of a conflict with society in
which society was the first offender.
Where community prevails, rather than alienation, the sense of belonging is
not to be sharply distinguished from the inclination to comply with the reasonable
requirements of the community. A "community" is a group of people who live
their lives to some extent-possibly a very limited extent-in common. To see
myself as "belonging" to a community is to see the institution or other members
of the group as "having something to say about" how I live and act-perhaps
not about every department of my life, and only to a reasonable extent about
any department of it, but it is part of the terms of the relationship that their
demands on certain subjects are expected to have some weight with me. And
valuing such a relationship-loving it or respecting it-implies some willingness
to submit to reasonable demands of the community. One is willing to comply,
not as a means of satisfying a desire to belong, but as an expression of one's
sense that one does belong, and one's endorsement of that relationship.
(3) It also matters what are the attributes of the demander. To put it crudely
and simply, one will have more reason to comply with demands made by an
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individual or group that one admires than by one that one holds a mean opinion
of. 5 If the demander is particularly impressive or admirable in any way-one
will see more reason to comply than if the demander seems ill-informed, foolish,
or in some other way contemptible.
(4) Finally, it matters motivationally how the demandee evaluates the demand
itself.6 It must be possible to perform such an evaluation without relying on fully
developed obligation concepts, if the character of the evaluation is to shed light,
without circularity, as I hope, on the nature of obligation. This requirement can
be satisfied, at least in part. You can start evaluating things simply on the basis
of how you value them. Is the demand one which appeals to you, or one which
disgusts or revolts you? Is it one which seems to be conducive to the things that
you prize most, admire most, and so forth? You could ask that about your
particular compliance, or you could ask it about general compliance, if that is
what is being demanded. And what is the wider social significance of the demand?
Is it an expression of a project or social movement that seems good or bad to
you? No obligation concepts at all are employed in these questions; yet the
answers to them both will and should affect the extent to which a social requirement gives you a reason for action. More serious problems for a social theory
of the nature of obligation may indeed arise from reflection on such evaluation;
but consideration of them is reserved for section 3.
Section 2: Guilt and Relationship
The nature of obligations cannot be understood apart from the reactions that
people have and are expected to have to the breach of an obligation; and central
to thes.e reactions is the notion of guilt. This is one of the main differences
between obligations and other sorts of reasons for action. If I fail to do what I
had the most reason to do, I am not necessarily guilty, and there is apt to be
nothing offensive about my reacting quite light-heartedly to the lapse. But if I
fail to do what I have an obligation to do, then (other things being equal) I am
guilty, and a light-hearted reaction would normally be offensive.
The word 'guilt' is not properly the name of a feeling, but of an objective
moral condition which may rightly be recognized by others even if it is not
recognized by the guilty person. However, feelings of guilt, and other reactions
to guilt, may reasonably be taken as a source of understanding of the objective
fact of guilt to which they point. We do not have the concept of guilt merely to
signify in a general way the state of having done something wrong. Such an
abstract conception of guilt fails to make intelligible, for example, the fact that
guilt can be expiated, discharged, or forgiven. It also results in a rather tight
and empty circle in understanding, inasmuch as a major part of what distinguishes
wrongness (as a member of the obligation family of properties) from other sorts
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of badness is precisely its connection with guilt.
It is true that one is not guilty, however unfortunate the outcome, for anything
that was not in some way wrong. But there are two other aspects of guilt that
are responsible for much of its human significance. One is the harm one has
caused to other people by one's (wrong) action. It is wrong to drive carelessly,
for example, and no less wrong when one is lucky than when an accident results.
But the burden of guilt one incurs is surely heavier when one's carelessness
causes the death of another person than when no damage is done. Many moralists
are uncomfortable with this fact; but even if we were to define 'guilt' one-sidedly
as meaning only the state of having done something wrong, the other, more
complicated fact of having caused great harm through one's wrongdoing remains,
and is a fact that we care about in a special way which is reflected in our actual,
intuitive use of the word 'guilt'.
Harm caused to other people is not a feature of all guilt, however. One can
be guilty for a violation of other people's rights that in fact harmed no one. And
even if harm has been caused, it is not a serious aggravation of guilt if it does
not fall heavily on some individual person or on some important project. If one
is responsible for a traffic accident, for example, it would be bizarre to feel
seriously guilty about a three-minute delay caused thereby to each passing
motorist, even if the number of people inconvenienced is large enough for the
aggregate delay to amount to a considerable cost by the standards appropriate
to a traffic engineer.
A more pervasive feature of guilt is alienation from other people, or (at a
minimum) a strain on one's relations with others. If I am guilty, I am out of
harmony with people. Typically there is someone who is, or might well be,
understandably angry at me. This feature is central to the role of guilt in human
life. It is connected with such practices as punishing and apologizing. And it
makes intelligible the fact that guilt can be (at least largely) removed by forgiveness.
Suppose I have done something that has offended a friend, resulting in estrangement. I think I was wrong to do it; I feel gUilty. But if there is a reconciliation
and my friend forgives me, I will fell released from the guilt. Indeed, I will be
released from the guilt. The view that in such a case the guilt consists largely
in an alienation produced by the wrong act is supported by the fact that the
ending of the alienation ends the guilt.
This point is confirmed by reflection on an alternative scenario. Suppose I am
not reconciled with my friend, but come to believe that the estrangement, though
painful to him, has on the whole been good for him. Will this release me from
the guilt? It will ease the burden, but not entirely remove it. In fact, I think it
will not release me from guilt as completely as my friend's forgiveness (even
combined with the belief that the estrangement has been bad for him) would.
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This suggests that alienation is not only a constituent, but a more important
constituent of guilt, in this type of case, than the harm caused to the other person.
This should not surprise us if we reflect on the way in which we acquired the
concept, and the sense, of guilt. In our first experience of guilt its principal
significance was an action or attitude of ours that ruptured or strained our relationship with a parent. There did not have to be a failure of benevolence or a violation
of a rule; perhaps we were even too young to understand rules. It was enough
that something we did or expressed offended the parent, and seemed to threaten
the relationship. This is the original context in which the obligation cluster of
moral concepts and sentiments arise. We do not begin with a set of moral
principles but with a relationship, actual in part and in part desired, which is
immensely valued for its own sake. Everything that attacks or opposes that
relationship seems to us bad.
Of course this starkly simple mentality is pre-moral. We do not really have
obligation concepts until we can make some sort of distinction, among the things
we do that strain relationships, between those in which we are at fault or wrong
and those in which we are innocent or right (not to mention those in which we
are partly wrong and partly right). We begin to grasp such a distinction as we
learn such facts as the following: Not every demand or expectation laid on us
by other people constitutes an obligation, but only demands made in certain
ways in certain kinds of relationship (for instance, commands of one's parents
and te:achers), and expectations that arise in certain ways (for instance, from
promises). An unexpressed wish is not a command. One is not guilty for anything
one has not really done. The fact that somebody is angry does not necessarily
imply that an obligation has been violated.
This development is compatible, however, with regarding obligations as a
species of social requirement, and guilt as consisting largely in alienation from
those who have required of us what we did not do. I believe it is not childish,
but perceptive and correct, to persist in this way of thinking about obligation
and guilt. This is a controversial position. It is generally agreed that learning
about guilt begins in the way that I have indicated, and that the value we place
on good relationships, not only with parents but also with peers, is crucial to
moral development. But many moralists hold that in the highest stages of the
moral life (perhaps not reached by many adults) the center of moral motivation
is transplanted from the messy soil of concrete relationships to the pure realm
of moral principles; and a corresponding development is envisaged for the sense
of guilt. Thus John Rawls traces the development of the sense of justice from
a "morality of authority" through a "morality of association" to a "morality of
principles"; corresponding to these three stages, he speaks of "feelings of (authority) guilt," "feelings of (association) guilt," and "feeling of (principle) guilt"only the last of these counting as "feelings of guilt in the strict sense."7
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It is certainly possible to come to value---even to love-an ethical principle
for its own sake, and this provides a motive for conforming to it. I doubt that
this is ever the most powerful of ethical motives; but what I would emphasize
here is that this way of relating to ethical principles has more to do with ideals
than with obligations. To love truthfulness is one thing; to feel that one has to
tell the truth is something else. Similarly, it seems to me that there is something
wrong-headed about the idea of "principle guilt."
To be sure, there are feelings of guilt for the violation of a rule, where 110
person is seen as offended. But these are typically remnants of a morality of
authority, and most plausibly understood as rooted in an internalization of childhood perceptions of requirements imposed by parents or other authority figures.
They are part of a heternonomous, not an autonomous, reaction. The fact that
the rule is seen as imposed on me, as something that I have to obey, is the ghost
of my conception of it as sponsored by a person or persons who will be (understandably) offended if it is violated.
Feelings of "principle guilt," as Rawls conceives of them, are not like that.
They are autonomous and based on one's valuing the rules, seeing them as
expressing one's nature as a rational agent in a society of free and equal members.
It is this non-compulsive, rational reaction to the breach of a personally valued
principle that seems to me not to be a recognition of guilt, but of something
different.
Suppose I have done something that is simply contrary to some principle that
I believe in. It is not that I have done significant harm to anyone, or alienated
myself from anyone. The situation does not call for apologies or reactions to
anticipated or possible or appropriate anger, because there is no one (let's suppose
not even God) who might be understandably angry with me about it. It does not
seems either natural or appropriate for me to feel gUilty in such a situation.
Maybe someone is entitled to think less of me for the deed. Perhaps I will see
less value in my own life on account of it. I may in this way be alienated from
myself, though not from anyone else. But these are reasons for feeling ashamed
or degraded, rather than for feeling guilty. 8 Guilt is not necessarily worse than
degradation, but they are different. And I think a main point of difference between
them is that, in typical cases, guilt involves alienation from someone else who
required or expected of us what we were obligated to do and have not done.

Section 3: The Supreme Demander

Much can be understood about the nature of obligation in terms of human
social relationships, as I have been trying to show. We even have a use for a
notion of "an obligation" that can be understood purely sociologically, and
therefore "naturalistically," in terms of a description of social practices such as
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commanding, promising, punishing, and apologizing, without any attempt to
evaluate these practices as good or bad. This is a pre-moral notion in at least
two ways.
(1) It is not the notion of an obligation that is "overriding" in the way that
fully moral obligation is. An obligation, in this sense, must give most participants
in the social system some reason to do what it obliges them to do; but it need
not override other considerations. So no understanding is presupposed here of
the nature of such an overriding.
(2) More fundamentally, the purely sociological notion is not the notion of a
morally valid or binding obligation. It is just the notion of an obligation or duty,
in the sense in which we can agree that Adolf Eichmann had a duty to arrange
for the transportation of Jews to extermination camps. Certainly this was not a
morally valid or binding duty at all, but it was in some sense a duty. It played
a part in a system of social relationships such that there were superiors who,
understandably (though immorally), would be angry if he did not do it, and in
relation to who he would feel uncomfortable if he did not do it, even if they did
not know of this omission. Obligations in this pre-moral sense can be good or
bad; they can even be morally repugnant, as Eichmann's was.
The nature of obligation in the pre-moral sense does not need a divine command
theory to explain it. That is a good thing, because divine command metaethics
itself presupposes a pre-moral, sociological conception of obligation. It is the
very core of a divine command theory to think of the divine/human relationship
on the model of a social relationship in which authority, commands, obedience,
loyalty, and belonging playa part. But we cannot really have these things without
both the reality and the concept of an obligation, in some sense. A command
imposes an obligation, or is the sort of thing that could impose an obligation.
And one who obeys a command sees herself as fulfilling an obligation arising
out of the command. There must therefore be some sort of obligation whose
nature cannot without circularity be explained in terms of anyone's commands.
What divine command metaethics is meant to explain is the nature of obligation,
not in the minimal, pre-moral sense, but in a stronger, fully moral sense.
The earlier sections of this paper were meant to show something of the importance of interpersonal or social relationships for the nature of obligation in even
a fully moral sense. The idea of trying to understand all obligation, including
moral obligation, as constituted by some sort of social requirement has its attractions. As the Eichmann case makes clear, however, any acceptable account of
the nature of moral obligation in terms of social requirements must incorporate
some way of evaluating the requirements; and it may be doubted whether a
descriptive sociological theory has the resources for the evaluation that is needed.
In section 1 I described some ways in which, without appealing to any criterion
of obligation as such, an individual can evaluate, and would naturally be expected
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to evaluate, demands made on her by other people, or by her community. That
sort of evaluation is subjective, however. Its subjectivity does not keep it from
being important to the motivational significance of obligation. But a definition
of moral obligation in terms of social requirements that "pass" that kind of
evaluation would not ascribe to moral obligation the objectivity or interpersonal
validity that it is supposed to have.
The need for a standard by which to evaluate them is not the only disadvantage
of human social requirements as a basis for understanding the nature of moral
obligation. They also fail to cover the whole territory of moral obligation. We
find that there are situations in which we would say, at least retrospectively,
that none of the existing human communities demanded as much as they should
have, or that there was something that really ought to have been required that
was not demanded by any community, or perhaps even by any human individual,
in the situation.
Moral obligation seems therefore to need a source or standard that is superior
to human social requirements. Can it be found? And can it have (at least a lot
of) the significance of obligations that are rooted in social requirements? In
particular, how much can it have of the motivational significance of social
requirements (as discussed in section 1 above)? And will it enable us to see
moral guilt as something more robust than "principle guilt," and as removed by
forgiveness (as discussed in section 2)? These advantages are not possessed by
all the supreme sources of obligation that have been proposed in metaethical
theories. I have already argued, for example, that the hypothetical deliverances
of an "ideal observer" lack the motivational force of actual social demands.
Where could we find a supreme source or standard of moral obligation which
has these advantages? The attempt has certainly been made to find it, after all,
in a human society, in some way both actual and ideal, to which we can be seen
as belonging. Emile Durkheim's lectures on Moral Education present a great
sociologist's fascinating development ofthis idea. But it seems pretty clear that
no actual human society is going to come close to filling this bill. To put it
crudely and simply, no actual human society is good enough for that.
Where else would we look for an ideal source of moral obligation? My proposal
is that we look to the set of ideas on which Durkheim quite openly and frankly
modeled his secular, sociological account of morality-that is, the theistic ideas.
Durkheim, following in the steps of Comte, was turning theistic ethics inside
out, as it were, to get his conception of society as the source of moral obligation.
I suggest that we tum the idea right side out again, and think of God as the
source. More precisely, my view is that commands or requirements9 actually
issued or imposed by a loving God are the supreme standard of moral obligation.
I will argue that they have much of the significance of social requirements as a
source of obligation.

272

Faith and Philosophy

The pivotal role of God's forgiveness in the ethical life of theists underlines
the advantages of divine command metaethics for the understanding of guilt. If
the supreme standard of ethical obligation is what is required by God, then a
violation of it is an offense against a person and not just against a principle, and
results in something that has the full relational significance of guilt, and not just
of disgrace or degradation. This relational significance enriches the possibilities
for dealing with guilt-most notably by helping us to understand ethical guilt
as something that can be removed by forgiveness.
Moreover, divine commands have the motivational significance of actual social
requirements. I will point out four motivational features of divine command
metaethics and of the divine commander corresponding (but in a different order)
to the four motivational features of human social requirements discussed in
section 1 above.
(1) One thing that matters to the motivational force of divine commands is
how God is related to us. It matters that he is our creator. It matters that he
loves Us.1O It matters that God has entered into covenant with us; it matters that
there is a history of relationship between God and the individual and between
God and the religious community-and that the divine commands playa significant role in this history, and are related to divine purposes that we see being
worked out in this history and having a certain importance for our lives. It matters
that all of these things about the relationship are such that, seeing them, we have
reason to value the relationship, rather than to be alienated from it.
(2)1t matters what God's attributes are. God is supremely knowledgeable and
wise--he is omniscient, after all; and that is very important motivationally. It
makes a difference if you think of commands as coming from someone who
completely understands both us and our situation.
It matters not only that God is loving but also that he is just. 11 'Just' is to be
understood here in a sense that is quite naturalistic and largely procedural. We
are applying to God a concept that has its original home in courts of law. Without
any appeal to a standard of fully moral obligation we can recognize certain truths
about justice: A just judge punishes people, if at all, only for things that they
have actually done. Merit and demerit have some relevance to the way it is just
to treat people. The just judge is interested in getting out, and acting in accordance
with . the truth. 12
Another important attribute of God is that he is beautiful or wonderful. This
is a point at which Durkheim understood religious ethics rather well, and tried
to exploit it for his purposes. "The good," he wrote, "is society ... insofar as
it is a reality richer than our own, to which we cannot attach ourselves without
a resulting enrichment of our nature."13 The religious root of this idea is obvious
and requires no further comment, except to say that Durkheim is quite right in
thinking that the richness, for us, of the being from which requirements proceed
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is a powerful motivating factor.
(3) It matters, for the motivation strength of divine command metaethics, what
it is that is demanded of us. And it matters how what is demanded relates to
our valuings. It matters motivationally, for example, that we do not believe that
God demands cruelty for its own sake. Here again in thinking of our valuings
we do not have to presuppose a full panoply of obligation concepts. It is enough
if in some sense we love kindness and feel revolted or disgusted at cruelty.
God's requirements function as an objective standard of obligation; but our
subjective valuings are important to the way in which the divine requirements
fulfill this function.
It is undoubtedly important that in theistic ethics the divine legislation is
generally seen as upholding the binding character of a large proportion of the
"obligations" defined by human institutions and practices. The divine/human
relationship is not simply a superior alternative to human society as a source of
obligation. Rather, God is seen as the chief member of a more comprehensive
social system or "family," which is reflected, though imperfectly, in actual
human relationships. Thus the motivational significance of divine and human
requirements is to a large extent integrated.
(4) Finally, it matters that the requirements are actually imposed by God.
Critics have argued that this does not really matter in divine command metaethics
as I have expounded it. They suggest that all the work is being done by the
stipulation that it is the demands of a loving God that bind-that really nothing
would be lost if we just said that our overriding, fully moral obligation is
constituted by what would be commanded by a loving God, whether there is
one or not. I want to say why I think that that is not an adequate substitute.
My reasons on this point parallel my reasons for not being satisfied with an
ideal, non-actual human authority as a source of moral obligation. First of all,
I do not believe in the counterfactuals. I do not believe that there is a unique
set of commands that would be issued by any loving God. There are some things
that a loving God might command and might not command. In particular, among
the things that I believe actually to be valid moral demands, there are some that
I think might have been arranged differently by a God who would still be loving,
and who would still satisfy the additional requirements of the metaethical theory.
For example, a loving God could have commanded different principles regarding
euthanasia from those that I believe are actually in force. 14
In the second place, even aside from any doubts about whether these counterfactuals about loving Gods are true, it seems to me that they are motivationally
weak. They do not have anything like the motivational or reason-generating
power of the belief that something actually is demanded of me by my loving
creator and heavenly father. The latter belief is therefore one that metaethics
cannot easily afford to exchange for the belief that such and such would have
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been demanded of me by a loving God.
Can the nature of moral obligation be adequately understood in terms of social
requirements? Yes, if our system of social relationships includes God. 15
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texts) in which God's demands may be communicated.
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13. Emile Durkheim, L' education morale (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1925), p. 110.
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